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I. INTRODUCTION
1. The distinct honor conferred on me touches my heart, but I
promise you that it will not go to my head. I realize that basically I am
honored because I have reached an advanced age. Nevertheless,
perhaps that age enables me to fully appreciate the trajectory of legal
progress made in the past few decades. I was asked by the organizers
of this conference to look back to my formative years and share with
you insights as regards international law and the law of armed conflict
(LOAC). Doing so, what comes first to mind is the unprecedented,
immense growth of international law. The universe of international
law appears to be very much like the physical universe: it is constantly
expanding. There are at present many domains of international law
that were entirely unknown when I graduated from law school, got my
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LL.M. degree, and wrote my doctoral thesis: nobody in those distant
days heard of jus cogens or erga omnes norms; nobody was gazing up
into outer space or staring down into the deep seabed; a permanent
international criminal court did not loom on the horizon; and
international environmental law was unexplored ground.
2. A more profound change relates not to the quantitative growth
of international law but to its qualitative standing. When I started my
academic career as a teacher, international law seemed to my students
to be far removed from what they encountered in their studies in other
legal courses and what they were likely to pursue as practitioners
subsequent o graduation. The common cynical comment at the time
was that international law is what the virtuous do not need and the
wicked do not obey. The main hurdle was to convince students that
international law merited being recognized as true law. This is no
longer an issue today. International law has been elevated from a
Wagnerian Netherworld to the spotlight of the center-stage. Hardly a
day goes by when international law is not in the news, usually on the
front pages of the world press. More to the point, perhaps, there is a
considerable number of lawyers in many countries-including, to their
own surprise, a few of my former students-who actually earn a living
thanks to international law.
3. As for LOAC, only half a century ago-to return to the metaphor
of international law as a universe-it could be described (in the "Star
Wars" lingo) as "a galaxy far, far away." I often feel nostalgia for that
long-gone era when LOAC was left alone by non-specialists. At that
remote time, in the civil society, only the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) was focusing on this subject (and it was carrying
out its mission with panache and professionalism). At present, almost
every "do-good" NGO in the world wants "a piece of the action"
(whether or not it passes muster in terms of proper professional
expertise). The overall setting is like that of a chess game, which
attracts a host of kibitzers. Kibitzers (a Yiddish term that has entered
the Webster Dictionary) are spectators who pester the actual players
with unsolicited advice and unwarranted critique. The reason for the
large number of kibbitzers who feel impelled to offer running
commentaries on LOAC operations is the desire to impress the
galleries of public onlookers. The public, once not particularly engag6
in the legal intricacies of armed conflict, has a craving now for a steady
diet of spicy LOAC tidbits of information. Unfortunately, the public
cannot always tell the difference between what is said by the kibitzers
and what is done by the actual players. Populist absorption of LOAC
norms and terminology can be superficial and even misleading. This
can become embarrassing, as witnessed over and over again on TV
news programs or talk shows, when the name of the Geneva
Conventions is taken in vain: they are frequently confused with other
instruments and cited even when they are utterly irrelevant to the
subject at hand.
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4. LOAC is divided into two parts, pertaining to international and
non-international armed conflicts (IACs and NIACs). IACs law started
to evolve in the mid-nineteenth century, whereas NIACs law made its
first steps only in the mid-twentieth century. Currently, most armed
conflicts in the world are NIACs. Colombia has just emerged from a
prolonged internal armed conflict. But large-scale NIACs are currently
raging in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Philippines,
as well as in many countries in Africa; and the blood-letting is
enormous. Although by now there is a great deal of convergence of the
two branches of LOAC, there has been no change at all in three
cardinal points of divergence:
(a) The Charter of the United Nations proscribes the use of force
in the relations between states: this is nowadays the most important
brick in the edifice of international law. Contrarily, neither the Charter
nor any other global treaty prohibits the use of force within a state. An
insurgency runs counter to the domestic law of the state concerned, but
international law maintains silence on the outbreak of internal strife.
(b) LOAC confers on combatants in IACs who get captured by the
enemy a privileged status of prisoners of war, which safeguards their
life and health although it subjects them to incarceration until the
cessation of active hostilities. Prisoners of war are not to be put on trial
for waging war unless they have acted in serious breach of LOAC.
Insurgent fighters in NIACs do not benefit from a parallel privilege.
They can be prosecuted in regular domestic courts-on the ground of
taking up arms against the government-and punished as ordinary
felons, despite the fact that their conduct fully corresponded with the
strictures of LOAC.
(c) The law of belligerent occupation, which is quite extensive in
scope, is applicable exclusively in IACs. Simply stated, there is no
belligerent occupation in a NIAC. When, for example, a Syrian city falls
into the hands of insurgents or is retaken by the incumbent
government, it cannot be regarded as occupied territory in the sense of
LOAC in either case.
5. What I have just said should be sufficient to denote that LOAC
is multifaceted. Many of you deal with issues relating to the classical
C3: command, control, and communications. When I take stock of
LOAC, I find it necessary to grapple with a different C3: confusions,
constraints, and challenges. I would like to share with you five of each
category.
II. CONFUSIONS
1. One regrettable confusion is derived from a trend to examine
LOAC through the lens of ethics rather than law. Numerous
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departments in universities-and even in military war colleges-
address LOAC as a theme of ethics. By itself, there is nothing wrong in
that. But ethicists do not always grasp that LOAC is much more than
a body of moral tenets: it is above all a juridical system. As such, it is
binding on Belligerent Parties, irrespective of their predilections. For
instance, the IDF has a well-known Ethical Code, which I applaud.
However, what is this Code? It is a unilateral statement of policy
adopted by the IDF General Staff, and-should the IDF General Staff
desire to do so-it has the discretion to amend the Code at any time in
an equally unilateral manner. By contrast, LOAC-as a multilateral
legal system-is not subject to unilateral modification by any country
acting alone. LOAC treaties, once adhered to, are binding on
Contracting Parties. Customary LOAC is the product of the
international community as a whole, and only general state practice
can alter it. That is why I find myself less preoccupied with the text of
the Ethical Code and more interested in the Israeli tangible
contribution to state practice. I would strongly recommend to the
Military Advocate General to launch work on an Israeli national
manual that would present LOAC as construed and applied by the IDF.
In my considered opinion, such a manual (like other national manuals
that now proliferate throughout the globe) would far outweigh the
Ethical Code.
2. The confusion about ethics and law blends with a frequent mix-
up between the causes of war and the waging of warfare. Ethicists,
political scientists, and other observers tend to analyze hostilities on
the basis of the litmus test of "just war." A not-uncommon inference is
that those belonging to the wrong side in a "just war" cannot benefit
from the protective umbrella of LOAC. This is a spurious
misconception running counter to a rudimentary postulate of LOAC
whereby it applies equally to all Belligerent Parties. The point may be
looked at as of purely academic interest. It is anything but. Thus, we
have recently had in Israel the famous Azaria case, relating to the
shooting to death of a wounded terrorist. Large segments of the Israeli
public took the position that a wounded terrorist-albeit neutralized
and disarmed-is literally an outlaw (i.e., out of the law) who can be
summarily executed. There were vigorous pressures to treat the culprit
shooter leniently, with some laymen putting him on a pedestal as a
hero. I would like to commend both the Military Advocate General who
decided to press penal charges and the Military Judges who convicted
the accused and sentenced him to jail. The fundamental norms of
LOAC are epitomized inter alia by the protection given to those who
are hors de combat. We must abide by these norms at all times, even
when we are in the midst of fighting "the children of darkness." The
justice of war simply cannot justify unjustifiable action under LOAC.
3. Another pernicious confusion is spawned by the dual existence
in armed conflict of human rights law and LOAC. Naturally, there is
some synergy and even a degree of overlap between the two branches
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of law. The prohibition of torture, which is reiterated in both bodies of
law, is a leading example of such overlap. But human rights law and
LOAC do collide head-on in certain critical areas. The archetypical case
in point relates to recourse to force. Put in a nutshell, the pivotal
question is whether lethal force can be used as a first resort or only as
a last resort. In ordinary law enforcement (police) action in peacetime,
lethal force can be employed against law-breakers only as a last resort.
Conversely, in the course of hostilities forming part of an armed
conflict, lethal force can be used against enemy combatants as a first
resort on a 24/7 basis. When human rights law and LOAC clash-as
they do in this respect-LOAC must prevail over human rights law
because-as recognized by the International Court of Justice and other
tribunals-it is the lex specialis. The trouble is that zealous advocates
of human rights law are not willing to yield the moral high ground.
They behave like the high priests of a Holy Gospel who regard any
deviation from their received dogma as apostasy. They fail to
appreciate the special nature of armed conflict and therefore contest
the overriding force of LOAC. They ignore the fact that LOAC-which
is directly responsive to the unique features of warfare-is a product
of a pragmatic compromise between military necessity and
humanitarian considerations. They think that, by rejecting military
necessity, they will lead us to utopia. But what they are liable to bring
about is dystopia. If international law were to ignore military
necessity, military necessity would ignore international law.
Belligerent Parties would simply shed off any inhibitions in the
conduct of hostilities.
4. A further confusion is between LOAC and international
criminal law. It has to be perceived that the substantive relevant law
is LOAC. International criminal law provides only a means to an end:
a tool designed to ensure compliance with LOAC. By its nature, the
tool is selective. As the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court makes clear, not all breaches of LOAC constitute war
crimes. Only assorted-serious-violations of LOAC do (these are
enumerated in detail in Article 8 of the Statute). But conventional
wisdom has it that, once defined as a war crime, every infraction
without fail must lead to trial by either an international court, a
domestic court, or a hybrid court (depending on jurisdictional
prerequisites). I do not question the need to convict and punish war
criminals where grave breaches of LOAC (to use the Geneva
Conventions' coinage) are concerned. But I have some reservations
about trial by civilian judges in cases that are not open-and-shut.
Specifically, I am not sure that such a trial is the most functional filter
for evaluating whether collateral damage to civilians ought to have
been deemed excessive in targeting a lawful target. The calculus of
proportionality in collateral damage is predicated not on hindsight (an
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actual civilian body count) but on foresight (the expectation of
incidental civilian losses-compared to the anticipated military
advantage from the attack-in light of the intelligence gathered and
available at the time of action). Decisions may have to be taken in split
seconds under tremendous pressure, and reconstruction of the
decision-making process after a considerable lapse of time may be
exceedingly tenuous. There must be a wide margin of appreciation
allowed to the actor, and I doubt whether the best judgment call in
such instances is made by civilian judges. Granted, legal oversight of
military operations is of vital importance; but I submit that, at least in
some circumstances, rigorous "peer eview" within the military system
(inquiring into what a reasonable commander would do under the
similar contingencies) may be more fruitful than second-guessing by
civilian judges who may lack any military experience.
5. Yet another confusion relates to the status of organized armed
groups in LOAC. There are two separate aspects of this status. One is
indisputable: an organized armed group constitutes a party to the
conflict in a NIAC when it leads an insurgency against the incumbent
government. As a party to the conflict, an organized armed group bears
obligations and is vested with rights prescribed by LOAC.
Nevertheless, an organized armed group cannot be equated to a state.
Hence, notwithstanding its status as a game player, an organized
armed group cannot contribute to the formulation of the rules of the
game. An organized armed group cannot be a Contracting Party to
LOAC treaties, and it does not play a part in the consolidation of
customary LOAC. The last point is where the confusion arises. Some
scholars and NGOs claim that the practice of organized armed groups
qualifies as an engine of customary international law. I cannot accept
this contention. It would bring about a seismic change in the present
architecture of international law, yet no legal sensors detect vibrations
indicating even the slightest tremor confirming it. Today, as in the
past, states insist on having a monopoly in the creation of international
law and are utterly unwilling to enable insurgent armed groups to
become partners in the process of international law-making. It is the
conduct of states-and of states alone-that continues to forge and
govern LOAC.
III. CONSTRAINTS
1. A well-known mantra, common in many circles, is that the
foremost problem of LOAC is not the need for additional legal norms
but the inadequate implementation of existing rules. Admittedly, law
is not just liturgy: it is not enough to enact and reiterate legal norms;
to be meaningful, these norms ought to be respected in reality. It is also
undeniable that the implementation of LOAC leaves a lot to be desired
(although-all too often-we tend to see the half-empty glass and
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ignore the half-full one). A number of attempts to ameliorate the
situation have been made, but it is like using a treadmill: you are
walking or even running but you are not advancing. The framers of
Hague Convention IV of 1907 thought that liability to pay financial
compensation for breaches of LOAC would resolve the problem; it has
not. Based on a rather vague wording of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
the ICRC has assumed a right of initiative that comprises persuasion,
mobilization (of third parties), and denunciation when confronted with
deliberate violations. Still, even the ICRC does not maintain that its
interventions have had spectacular results in terms of actual state
conduct. The drafters of Additional Protocol I of 1977 envisaged an
International Fact-Finding Commission, which has been set up and is
meeting regularly. The IFFC could have been an ideal instrument in
ensuring implementation of LOAC obligations, but it has a drawback:
it has never been activated in practice. International criminal law is
operative, but (as pointed out) it has its limitations and so far it has
not brought LOAC to the "promised land." New proposals designed to
enhance implementation have recently been put on the international
agenda. Yet, judging by previous experience, allow me to express
skepticism as to whether any new mechanisms (even if agreed upon)
will guarantee improvement in real-life performance. The quest for
better implementation of LOAC-like the quest for the Holy Grail-
may go on for quite a while.
2. In any event, it is a gross mistake to presuppose that better
implementation is the sole obstacle that LOAC has to contend with.
Every major war serves as a crucible in which LOAC is put to the test
of reality. Hostilities expose weaknesses in the pre-war legal system,
and it is perennially necessary to adapt the law to new developments.
Moreover, as formed over the years, LOAC stitches together diverse
layers of the legal fabric in a patchwork manner. LOAC started with
the law of the sea, moved to wounded and sick, then prisoners of war,
occupied territories, etc. In the post-WWII period, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 focused on hors de combat and the protection of
civilians. In 1954, under the aegis of UNESCO, it was the turn of
cultural property. AP/I of 1977 stressed targeting and methods of
warfare. AP/II regulated NIACs. A string of treaties was devoted to
sundry types of weapons. Patchwork, almost ineluctably, means gaps
and lacunas. What is patently necessary today is a systematic review
of LOAC in its entirety, but-sad to say-that is not in the cards any
time soon. In the course of the twentieth century, the Geneva
Conventions were reviewed on no less than four separate occasions:
1906, 1929, 1949, and 1977. By contrast, exactly forty years after the
last occasion (the formulation of AP/I and AP/II in 1977) and seventeen
years into the twenty-first century, states are shying away from any
proposal to reexamine existing LOAC in a holistic fashion. Whenever
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initiatives (however tentative) are taken along these lines-for
instance, in the so-called Alabama Process started by the Swiss in
2003-they are strenuously resisted. Governments are unwilling to
take the risk of opening a new Pandora's Box of legal toil and trouble
after prolonged fights over AP/I, which have brought about a "Great
Schism" between Contracting and non-Contracting Parties to the
instrument (the latter led by the United States and including Israel as
well as India and Pakistan). The "Great Schism" has a price of faulty
interoperability, particularly in combined operations where the armed
forces of even close allies (like the United States and the United
Kingdom) are bound by diverse treaty regimes and march to the
beating of different legal drums. Still, the battle needs have so far
proved unable to overcome the weight of "battle fatigue" attached to
the preparation of new treaties. Instead of new treaties, what we have
is several informal restatements of the law: principally, the 1994 San
Remo Manual on sea warfare and the 2010 HPCR Manual on air and
missile warfare. There is also the Talinn Manual on cyber warfare.
Soon there will be the Oslo Manual on select problems of LOAC. Yet,
informal restatements-irrefutably useful as they are-cannot fully
replace treaties, inasmuch as only treaties can be legally binding. The
moral is that inactions by states-like actions-have their
consequences.
3. Almost all the countries represented here are facing at this
juncture enemies-chiefly the so-called Islamic State-consisting of
irregular fighters who commit systematic atrocities with total disdain
for civilian lives. These fighters are not merely oblivious to civilian
casualties: they do their utmost to increase such casualties. The
depredations amount to flagrant violations of the principle of
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, which is the
foundation of LOAC in the literal sense that-if you undermine the
foundation-the whole structure might crumble. LOAC is not
contingent on reciprocity. When we comply with LOAC, this is not
about them (our enemies) but about us. Nevertheless, when systematic
atrocities committed by the enemy are not the exception but the rule,
it becomes difficult to restrain our own forces from retaliating. Turning
the other cheek is not a viable option: it is a theological concept,
appropriate for a Sermon on the Mount rather than for a battlefield.
Trying to turn the other cheek in the practice of states at war is likely
to prove a triumph of hope over experience. It should be remembered
that LOAC itself permits belligerent reprisals in appropriate instances
(as was confirmed by the ICTY in the Marti6 case of 2007-2008),
although the extent of lawful reprisals depends on whether the acting
state is or is not a Contracting Party to AP/I.
4. Sporadic atrocities are liable to be committed by our own forces,
too. Stories of such atrocities tend to draw our enemies together and to
drive us apart. When public opinion is outraged by atrocities
committed by our own troops, this can subvert the overall war effort.
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As the Vietnam War amply demonstrates, we live in an era in which-
regardless of military victories in the field-a war may be lost merely
because public opinion swings against it. Public opinion is largely
dependent on media coverage, so that ultimate mission
accomplishment is often contingent on positive handling by the media.
Three significant factors must be taken into account in this context:
(a) While it is quite complicated-perhaps even impossible-to tell
what exactly is happening on the "other side of the hill" (where cameras
are present only when they serve the interests of our enemies), it is
easy for the media to keep a close watch ontwhat our troops are doing.
(b) Either subliminally or overtly, there are higher media
expectations from our troops. The same journalists who are likely to
turn a blind eye to systematic atrocities perpetrated by our adversaries
will start a hue and cry when encountering even an isolated serious
breach of LOAC committed by our own forces.
(c) Whereas a lot is being done by all modern armed forces to train
soldiers, sailors, and aviators-especially officers of all ranks-in the
intricacies LOAC, not enough is being done to instruct journalists as to
what is permissible and impermissible in military engagements. Media
reports are therefore frequently predicated on false assumptions as to
the "do"s and "don't"s of warfare.
5. Frequently, there are passionate debates as to whether what we
are doing in war is in full harmony with LOAC. As a rule, when the
law is equivocal or controversial, the legal literature can become a
useful tool in identifying and interpreting normative obligations. I
myself regularly contribute to that literature, and I am not inclined to
trivialize its potential import as a roadmap for practitioners. All the
same, it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of a cottage industry
of law review articles trying to recast LOAC, reconciling it with
conditions of some fantasy land in which war can be conducted without
putting any civilian in harm's way. These writings are produced not
only by preachers of human rights ascendancy but also by LOAC
theorists who are constantly citing each other without much concern
for battleground realities (of which they seem to know very little). For
persons familiar with general state practice, this is a matter of
bemusement or perhaps even amusement. It is accordingly advisable
to keep in mind that LOAC-just like other branches of international
law-is created solely by states, in treaties or in custom. The legal
chatter of armchair quarterbacks is no different from static in a
telecommunications system. It must be separated from the genuine
sound of law.
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IV. CHALLENGES
1. An obvious challenge to LOAC is posed by the inexorable
advance of battle-related state-of-the-art technology. Yet, the
consequences of high-tech developments are sometimes overrated and
at other times underrated. They can be overrated because a
technological change does not necessarily require a reform of
preexisting LOAC principles. By way of illustration, take drones.
Legions of civilian commentators are obsessed with drones. However,
in the final analysis, drones are aerial platforms: they are remotely
piloted but not different in essence from other aerial platforms. The
challenge posed by drones to LOAC is consequently overrated: LOAC
is perfectly capable of, so to speak, bringing drones under its wings. On
the other hand, with some futuristic technologies, my advice is not to
underrate their ultimate impact on LOAC and not to theorize in
advance of the facts. I am saying that in light of a spate of scholarly
conferences being convened, where conjectures are made as to what
legal rules will apply to fully autonomous weapons using artificial
intelligence (AI), namely weapon systems exercising reasoning powers
without the intervention of any "man in the loop" or "man on the loop."
These weapons are not likely to be introduced into combat for a decade
or two; they raise awesome conundrums about accountability
(especially criminal responsibility) in case they malfunction or go
rogue; and, to my mind, answers should lie in wait until we have a
much better picture of what the technology will actually look like.
2. What is plainly underrated today is the challenge to LOAC
presented not by high-tech means of warfare but by low-tech methods
of warfare. Those who constantly lift their eyes to the sky (drones) and
crystal-ball the future (fully autonomous Al weapons systems) seem to
be prone to losing their footing when it comes to here-and-now
mundane stumbling blocks relating to military operations on the
ground. The paradigmatic methods of warfare that I have in mind are
the use of suicide bombers and the willful screening of combatants by
involuntary human shields. Take the use of suicide bombers who
deliberately cause carnage among civilians (like the massive attack of
9/11 or smaller-scale but still horrendous attacks characteristic of the
various armed conflicts in Middle East). How can we deter the
perpetrators of such crimes? Evidently, you cannot punish the dead
and a successful suicide bomber is beyond the reach of the law. Still,
the question that must be faced is: Are there any counter-measures,
likely to deter a future suicide bomber from his or her mission, that can
be taken in conformity with LOAC? Israel believes that demolition of
the family house of the suicide bomber is an effective deterrent
counter-measure. Whether it is or is not, demolition of a house as an
administrative sanction is-in my opinion (and, of course, not only in
mine)-incompatible with LOAC. I prefer the sealing off (or locking up)
of the family house without demolishing it: this is less drastic, equally
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deterrent, and not as such necessarily a breach of LOAC. Some creative
thinking may lay the ground for taking additional, hopefully even more
effective counter-measures that are not illicit. To my way of thinking,
such thinking is indispensable: we cannot afford to sit idly by, watching
terrorist infringements erode LOAC to a vanishing point.
3. That brings me to the broader challenge to LOAC presented by
civilians directly participating in hostilities. The failure of an ICRC
endeavor to engender a consensus on the range and repercussions of
this omnipresent phenomenon has left much of the relevant law
shrouded in doubt. Suffice it to mention the controversial ICRC-
advocated requirement of continuous combat function against three
different backgrounds:
(a) The incidence of the so-called revolving door of "farmers-by-
day, fighters-by-night" and their susceptibility to attack at a time slot
in between engagements in hostilities. The ICRC looks at every
fraction of DPIH activity separately. I (and others like me) highlight
the continuum.
(b) The DPIH standing of members of organized armed groups who
serve as cooks, drivers, administrative assistants, legal advisers, etc.
In my opinion, it is wrong to discriminate between legal advisers in the
government armed forces (like many present here)-who are
categorized as combatants and are susceptible to attack-and those
who are members of organized armed groups and are consequently
exempt from attack according to the ICRC. For sure, organized armed
groups are not inclined to issue membership cards. But for that very
reason, the expectation that in the thick of battle a distinction can be
made between actual fighters and accompanying support staff is
illusionary.
(c) The DPIH status of those who orchestrate behind the scenes
the combat activities of others through military planning, training, and
recruiting of personnel. Those who fire arms are often pawns
manipulated by others who are literally calling the shots while
purportedly belonging to a political rather than military wing of the
organized armed group. The problematics of these and other
outstanding DPIH issues is fraught with battlefield dilemmas that
refuse to go away.
4. Adapting LOAC to new modes of fighting like DPIH is crucial:
if not by treaty (and I have drawn attention to the general reluctance
of states to engage in new LOAC treaty making), then through
customary law. But is customary law capable of developing swiftly
enough when the exigencies of the situation demand it? Some scholars
argue that a quick fix and custom are a contradiction in terms. I
disagree. Customary international law has displayed an astounding
capability of rapid growth in the dawn of the new legal regime of the
continental shelf. In the field of LOAC itself, the exponential upsurge
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of NIAC customary law-within the span of a single generation-
furnishes reassuring proof for the potential velocity of general state
practice. That said, an acceleration in the rate of growth of customary
LOAC does not happen by itself. It is fully contingent on a general
perception of an imperative need for the emergence of new law. Such a
perception must emanate from a prevailing zeitgeist. The rub is to
shape this zeitgeist.
5. Here is where you come into the picture, ladies and gentlemen.
I think that you-the legal personnel of the armed forces and
Ministries of Defense-are ideally positioned to influence the hearts
and minds of your military and civilian masters; to prompt them to face
the challenges of LOAC, despite all the confusions and the constraints.
It is the kind of mission for which no medals are struck, the kind of
campaign at the conclusion of which no triumphs are celebrated, yet
the mission and the campaign are invaluable in their importance. I
hope that, by working together, you will create and maintain a C2: a
consortium of the concerned. May such a consortium develop through
conferences like the present one and go from strength to strength.
